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Security is considered to be one of the main challenges as regards the widespread applica-
tion of Service Oriented Architectures across organisations. WS-Security, and its successive
extensions, have emerged to fulfil this need, but these approaches hinder the loose-coupling
among services, therefore constraining their reusability and replaceability. Software adapta-
tion is a soundsolution toovercomethe incompatibilities in interface, behaviourandsecurity
constraints among stateful services. However, programming adaptors from scratch is a te-
dious and error-prone task where special care must be given to concurrency and security
issues. In this work, we propose to use security adaptation contracts that allow us to express
and adapt the security requirements of the services and their orchestration. Given a security
adaptation contract and the behavioural description of the services (such as BPEL processes
orWindowsWorkflows),we cangenerate theprotocol of the orchestrator that complieswith
the security requirements (confidentiality, integrity and authenticity), while overcoming in-
compatibilities at the signature, behaviour and security QoS levels. The formalisation behind
security adaptation contracts has other applications such as security policy negotiation and
automatic security protocol verification.
© 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Service Oriented Architectures (SOA) are composed of interoperable Web Services. However, Web Services (WS) are not
always compatible, a fact which hinders both their reusability, and the development and maintenance of SOA systems. This
is particularly important in stateful services with complex behaviour (such as those described as BPEL processes [2] or
Windows Workflows [25]) where any mismatch in the sequence of the messages exchanged may lead the composition to
a deadlock situation. For instance, a missing operation in a service, a mismatch in the operation name or arguments, or an
unexpected sequence of messages prevent the correct termination of the services involved.
Software adaptation [8,26] is a sound solutionwhich enablesWeb Services to interoperate despite their initial incompat-
ibilities. This adaptation is achieved by deploying an adaptor, either as a set of wrappers or as a centric orchestrator, which
is in charge of receiving, translating and rearranging the messages in the way expected by the destination service.
Adaptor design is a difficult task where the developer must take into account the behaviour of all the services and their
possible interactions. In this process, subtle details may be missed, therefore resulting in an erroneous adaptation. We
propose adaptation contracts as an abstract specification of the adaptation. These contracts will allow us to state clearly and
concisely how to solve the incompatibilities among the services.
The adaptation of security-enabled messages, such as SOAP messages enhanced with WS-Security, comprises a new set
of problems since the different parts of a message might be encrypted, signed or digested. In this case, security adaptors
must be able to (i) decrypt and verify some of these data on receptions, and (ii) encrypt, sign and digest some other parts of
the message as expected by the destination service.
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In addition to singlemessage security, security protocols such as those expressed byWS-SecureConversation orWS-Trust,
impose further restrictions between the sequences of exchanged messages. These protocols might involve session keys (i.e.,
keys which are created, shared and used throughout the session), timestamps and nonces (which stands for number used
once) to avoid replay attacks, and proof of possession mechanisms (where a service authenticates its identity by proving
that it has certain information), among others. This manipulation of security-enabled messages is particularly difficult due
to the sensitive nature of their contents so, depending on the particular system, security adaptors must be able to access
some sensitive information (such as private keys), to generate new security tokens such as new keys and timestamps, and
establish and assess trust relationships. All these new capabilities complicate even more the design of security adaptors.
In this work, we present security adaptation contracts that not only address incompatibilities between services but also
cover several security-relatedWS-* specifications in a high-level and integrated manner, hence reducing the effort required
from the system architect. Security adaptation contracts enable us to specify how to adapt signature, behaviour and security
incompatibilities among services; they describe the security checks that must be performed over the received messages;
and, due to their centric role in the conversation, they provide a formal framework to analyse the behaviour of the system.
Compared to other kinds of contracts, the adaptation contracts presented in this work are specifications on how the
orchestration must proceed. These specification contracts are extended by security adaptation contracts, which are agree-
ments over the security requirements between the service provider and the orchestrator. As contracts, security adaptation
contracts are subject to be negotiated, but this aspect is not covered in this work. In terms ofmonitoring, security adaptation
contracts represent the security policy that must be enforced on messages intercepted by the adaptor at run time. In the
presence of security violations, the adaptor is in charge of taking the appropriate measures such as interrupt every com-
munication with the compromised service and notify the other services in the orchestration. Security adaptation contracts
can be used for dynamic adaptation in the sense that we can have several contracts previously stored in the system and,
once we receive a session request, we could generate at run time the adaptor that complies with any of the contracts and
the available services. However, our previous approach to dynamic adaptation does not support reconfiguration once the
session has begun. 1
Themain contribution of this paper is the inclusion of security concerns intoWeb Service adaptation contracts. These new
contracts allow us to express the different adaptations required over the behaviour of the services for them to interoperate
properly, as well as the security requirements that must be met during the communication. The purpose of the security
requirements in adaptation contracts is to specify: (i) the security checks that must be satisfied by every received message
and their sequence in secure conversations, and (ii) the transformations which must be effected on the security policy of a
service so that it adapts to the security constraints of the system.
Incompatibilities among servicesmake their composition impossible due tomismatches that disable the communication
and lead the services to deadlock situations. These incompatibilities may be present at different levels:
Signature level is the level most covered by the literature and comprises mismatches in the name, arguments and types of
the operations offered and required by service interfaces.
Example: A service which offers a different WSDL description than expected.
Behavioural level takes into account not only the signature of the operations but also theparticular sequence inwhich those
operations must be called or offered. Loops, internal choices (i.e., if-sentences) and external choices (pick-sentences)
are also covered by the behavioural specification of services. Incompatibilities at this level may lead the composition to
undesirable states where one service expects a call from another service which is not able to comply, therefore the system
reaches a deadlock.
Example: A BPEL process which waits for an invocation to operation A and then B would deadlock if composed with a
service that first invokes B and then A, even though they have compatible WSDL signatures.
Non-functional level deals with other criteria than the specific behaviour of the service and it is often referred to as Quality
of Service (QoS). Some of the concerns of this level are availability, performance, reliability, scalability and security.
Example: A login message that is to be encrypted although it is sent as clear text by the other party.
Semantic level. At this level, services and their requirements are expressed by their meaning and not by a particular en-
coding. Incompatibilities at this level are present when a service designed for one purpose is used for a different one.
Example: To use a search engine service as a spell checker.
In previous work [3,6], we covered contract-based adaptation up to the behavioural level, therefore we focus this paper
on the inclusion of security QoS into such contracts.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present an example to motivate and illustrate how security
adaptation contracts are used to orchestrate incompatible services in behaviour and security QoS. Section 3 formalises
securitymessages andhowtheyareusedby thebehaviour of the services (Definition 2). Security specifications are composed
of security primitives, and these primitives must preserve some properties to be sound with regard to security (e.g., avoid
hash collisions). Sound security primitives are described in Definition 4.
Once security enabled services aredefined,weproceed to formalise security adaptation inSection 4.Adaptation is enabled
by security adaptation contracts (Definition 9), which are composed of contract terms (Definition 5). These contract terms are
1 See [5] for an approach to contract-based run-time adaptation.
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fundamental for security adaptors and will serve to match the messages sent and expected by the services (Definition 11).
This matching will trigger the communication between the adaptor and any of the services, formalised in Definition 14.
Definition 13 describes how the communication must pass the security checks expressed in the contract. We demonstrate
how the behaviour of the adaptor is perfectly determined based on its current state and the exchanged data (Corollary 1 and
Proposition 3 for input and output actions, respectively). Then, we demonstrate the properties preserved by valid security
contract terms in Theorem 1. Finally, we prove that the adaptor recognises if the security expressed in the contract is
respected or violated (Theorem 2) when it communicates with any of the services.
Related work and possible applications are discussed in Section 5 and we conclude with some final remarks in Section 6.
The formal demonstration of all the properties stated above is presented in Appendix A and Appendix B gives the intuition
behind the automatic generation of adaptors from security adaptation contracts.
2. Motivational example
Web Services with security requirements present a tight coupling with the format, security algorithms and protocols
used by the messages in their communications. In this section, we illustrate a scenario where such restrictions prevent the
proper communication among services and, in this way, we motivate the need for security adaptation contracts.
Example 1. In Fig. 1, we present the behaviour of four services for performing secure shell operations (similar to the SSH
protocol). Servicesaanda′ try toget access to the functionalityprovidedeitherby serviceborb′, but incompatibilitiesprevent
proper communication. These behaviours are represented by labelled transition systems (LTS, [21]) where operation names
are quoted and prefixed with ‘!’ and ‘?’ in output and input actions, respectively. Operations also have a list of arguments
with security expressions. Internal operations (i.e., transitions without external communication) are represented with τ . In
this example, we shall focus on services a and b.
On one side, service a (Fig. 1(a)) can perform several requests (with its credential and request as arguments), which can be
refused or followed by replies. It is important to highlight that the values for name and passmust remain constant throughout
the session, so the same values must be sent in every iteration of the loop. Additionally, parameter nonce is used to correlate
requests and replies while avoiding replay attacks.
On the other side, service b (Fig. 1(b)) begins by notifying its availability with a proceed message. Then it must receive a
loginmessage with the credentials, which can be either accepted (another proceed) or denied. If the login is accepted, several
requests can be made (with their results). Additionally, the service allows users to upload files.
Fig. 1. Behaviour of services simulating different ways to perform secure shell operations.
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These services are incompatible at signature (e.g., “refused” with “denied”), behaviour (e.g., unexpected “proceed”) and
security levels (e.g., service a uses an encrypted password, requires the digest of the data, and correlates requests and
replies with the argument nonce). Services a and b present complementary functionality and semantics but, due to these
incompatibilities, security adaptation is required to make them to cooperate successfully.
Behavioural adaptation is achieved by deploying an adaptor in the middle of the communication with such behaviour
that it receives, recomposes and forwards every messages it receives in a way that all the services can interact properly
and end up in a stable state. The behaviour of such adaptors can increase exponentially with the complexity of the services
involved and their design requires taking into account all the possible interleaving between the messages exchanged.
Therefore, we propose to describe adaptors with security adaptation contracts, which abstract away from concurrency
issues and focus on themapping between the operations, arguments and security of the services. This mapping is expressed
as a set of vectorswhich correlate the operations of the services. These vectors use symbolic parameters in place of arguments
and they contain security expressions to process, analyse and recompose the messages.
In addition, we might want to enforce some additional requirements over the adaptation such as “a particular message
must not be sent more than x times” or “an operation A will be (un)available until the operation B is called”. These re-
quirements constrain the application order of the interactions expressed by vectors. In order to represent such high-level
requirements, adaptation contracts also include a vector-LTS (or VLTS, for short) which is a LTS with adaptation vectors as
labels. If such restrictions are not required, the vector-LTS is considered to be a single initial and final state with all the
transitions looping on it.
Example 2. There are several incompatibilities between services a and b (Fig. 1) which are solved by the adaptation contract
C0 in Fig. 2. First, the “proceed” messages sent from b are received by the adaptor due to vector vp. Operations have been
prefixed with the service identifier. Vector vl maps the login request at service b with the appropriate arguments coming
from the first request of a. Symbolic parameters will be bound to the received values (e.g., I, P, R and N on the left hand
side of vl). Parameters with a superscript ‘
∧’ will be replaced by a value already known by the adaptor, therefore enc(K∧, P)
indicates that the value thatwill be bound to parameter P is encryptedwith a known key K∧. This key, whichmust be known
at the beginning of the session, is given in a initial adaptor environment E0. This environment states that parameter K is a
key, and x is its run-time value. Parameters I and P are used to compose the “login” message to be sent to service b. Vector vq
processes the req argument (inR) of the initial request. Once thefirst request has been fully received, subsequent requests can
be mapped directly with vectors vr and vd. Arguments name and pass are checked to be always the same due to superscript
‘∧’. Nonces are updated and reused accordingly in vectors vl, vr, vd and vf . Vector vr can conflict with vq therefore we use
the VLTS0 (Fig. 2(b)) to enforce that vq is triggered only the first time. Vector vq is guaranteed to be triggered first because of
the need to send b:? “login” at the beginning of b. Fig. 3 shows an adaptation protocol which complies with C0 and services
a and b. The transition labels have been reduced to the characters underlined in C0 and prefixed with the identification of
the corresponding service.
The intuition behind contracts is that adaptation vectors are enabled by the current state of the VLTS and triggered by
synchronisation of an operation of one of their sides with a service. Once a two-sided vector is triggered by one of its sides,
the operation on the other side must eventually be synchronised before the behaviour of the adaptor reaches a final state.
Vectors with only one operation can be used independently. Interleaving between vectors is allowed and the current state
of the VLTS is updated as soon as a vector is triggered by any of its sides.
Fig. 2. Adaptation contract for services a and b.
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Once we have an adaptation contract and the behavioural description of the services, we use state-of-the-art techniques
[6,15] for the automatic generation of the adaptor protocol. These techniques explore all the required interleaving among
the messages enabled by the contract, prune those branches which lead the system to deadlock or livelock situations, and
reduce the state-space of the protocol by removing duplicated and unnecessary paths. These techniques, however, do not
Fig. 3. Adaptation protocol for contract C0 and services a and b.
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support the adaptation of security concerns, yet they can be enabled by the security adaptation contracts presented in this
work.
2.1. The role of contracts
Security adaptation contracts concisely represent the mapping of the operations, arguments and security requirements
among services. Adaptation contracts abstract away from concurrency issues, leaving them to the adaptor generation phase.
This is especially important because adaptation protocols grow exponentially with the complexity, incompatibilities and
interleaving among services. In fact, for finite service behaviours, adaptation protocols are potentially infinite in states
and transitions, whereas security adaptation contracts are not. For instance, Fig. 3 has several dashed transitions which
correspond to additional requests received before processing the previous one. These transitions represent a potentially
infinite stack of pending requests, in contrast to the small size of the contract (Fig. 2) and services (a and b in Fig. 1) which
resulted in this adaptor.
Additionally, adaptation contracts support high level restrictions expressed in vector-LTS. The level of abstraction of the
contracts makes them versatile enough to cope with small changes in the behaviour of the services. Let us note that the
same contract with different services can generate different adaptation protocols. For instance, any combination between
services {a, a′} × {b, b′} is supported by the same contract C0 but not by the same adaptor (i.e., the adaptor in Fig. 3 does
not work for {a, a′} × b′). Finally, security adaptation contracts are subject to be negotiated2 among service providers, but
this is out of scope in this work.
2.2. Methodology for security adaptation
Our methodology for behavioural Web Service adaptation involves the following steps:
1. First, we abstract the behaviour of the services to our formal model. This model allows us to represent the sequence
of messages sent and expected by a service and the order in which they must occur. This is done automatically from
the public description of the behaviour of the services written in abstract BPEL or Windows Workflow. Security can
be extracted fromWS-Security messages or WS-Policy specifications.
2. Then, taking the behaviour into account, we must design (either assisted with a CASE tool [7] or automatically [14])
an adaptation contract able to solve all of the incompatibilities among the services. At this stage, we can do static
validation of the contract (i.e., the contract is well defined) and, although there are not any data nor the concrete
adaptor to test the adaptation, we still can perform symbolic simulation over the contract by hand-picking which
adaptation vectors to apply at every moment. In addition, using this simulation, we can do symbolic model-checking
based on the contract and the model of the services.
3. Using the contract and the behaviour of the services, the protocol of the adaptor is generatedwhile taking into account
all possible interleaving among messages. The resulting adaptor conforms to the given contract, it is encoded into a
particular implementation language (currently BPEL), and it can finally be deployed as a single orchestrator [15] or
distributed [22] in a set of wrappers over the services.
The goal of this methodology is to generate correct adaptors which are: (i) secure, i.e., they enforce the security policies
expressed in the security adaptation contract and security-enabled services; (ii) non-intrusive, since adaptors do not alter the
internal behaviour of the services and, in fact, services can be oblivious to adaptation; and (iii) transparent, because adaptors
should support every possible interaction which complies with the security policies of the contract and services and does
not cause deadlock or livelock situations.
It is worth observing that the whole methodology is supported by our toolbox called ITACA [6], which is enhanced with
hierarchical adaptation, simulation and verification capabilities over the entire composition. ITACA supports behavioural
adaptation but it is yet to be extended with security concerns.
3. Web Services with security QoS
Security concerns over Web Services are regarded as a major research challenge for service oriented computing [19].
The loose coupling feature of WSs, which enables their higher reusability and interoperability, is often constrained by
new security requirements over those services. If we assume that the services we want to orchestrate are incompatible at
signature or behavioural levels, and therefore the messages sent and expected are incompatible, we will have to deal with
the mismatches among the security elements in those messages. For instance, a password that is to be encrypted but it is
sent as clear text, some data whichmust be sent with their hash values in order to check their integrity but those digests are
missing, a nonce that it is sent to correlate a request with its reply but that nonce is not returned in the reply, or something
that must be signed but it is not.
2 See [3] for a discussion about the negotiation of adaptation contracts among behavioural services without security.
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Listing 1. WS-Security enabled SOAP message
1 <Envelope><Header>
2 <Security>
3 <Timestamp Id="T0"> . . . </Timestamp>
4 <BinarySecurityToken ValueType=" . . . #X509v3"
5 Id="X509Token"> . . .
6 </BinarySecurityToken>
7 <EncryptedKey> . . .
8 <ReferenceList>
9 <DataReference URI="#enc1" />
10 </ ReferenceList>
11 </EncryptedKey>
12 <Signature><SignedInfo> . . .
13 <Reference URI="#T0"> . . .
14 <DigestValue>LyLsF094Pi4wP . . . </DigestValue>
15 </ Reference>
16 <Reference URI="#body"> . . .
17 <DigestValue>LyLsF094i4wPU . . . </DigestValue>
18 </ Reference>
19 </ SignedInfo>
20 <SignatureValue>Hp1ZkmFZ/2kQ . . . </SignatureValue>
21 <KeyInfo>
22 <SecurityTokenReference>
23 <Reference URI="#X509Token" />
24 </ SecurityTokenReference>
25 </KeyInfo>
26 </Signature>
27 </ Security>
28 </Header>
29 <Body Id="body">
30 <EncryptedData Id="enc1"> . . . </EncryptedData> . . .
31 </Body></Envelope>
In this section, we formalise stateful services with security requirements over their messages. This will allow us not
only to adapt security-enabled services but also to express in a concise manner the security requirements for the whole
orchestration and to analyse security properties over the expected behaviour of the system in Section 4.
3.1. WS-Security
Due to the system-independent nature of Web Services, several specifications have emerged to express security re-
quirements and properties over WSs and their orchestration. The specifications which are relevant for this work are briefly
described below:
WS-Security describes enhancements to SOAP messaging to provide quality of protection through message integrity, mes-
sage confidentiality, and single message authentication. Thesemechanisms can be used to accommodate a wide variety of
security models and encryption technologies. Security tokens are one of themain concepts inWS-Security. Security tokens
are sets of claims (such as user names, keys or certificates) used for encryption, signature or authentication. WS-Security
enables SOAPmessages to describe the security transformations required to decrypt, authenticate and verify the different
parts of the message by the intended recipient, therefore allowing end-to-end security. Listing 1 presents an extract of a
SOAP message with WS-Security elements.
WS-Trust defines how to issue, renew and validate security tokens that will be used to establish, assess and broker trust
relationships among entities. They define an entity called Security Token Service that covers all the operations required
for handling security tokens. The Security Token Service provides a trusted third party which asserts trust relationships
among entities. Actual implementations are encouraged to make use of existing solutions that are compatible with this
specification such as Kerberos or X.509 public-key certificates.
WS-SecureConversation is yet another extension toWS-Securitywhichdefines Security Context Tokens. These tokens,which
are handled by the mechanisms described in WS-Trust, are used as shared secrets for establishing secure sessions (i.e.,
secure conversations). Additionally, new keys can be derived by both parties from the shared Security Context Token.
With WS-SecureConversation, the security constraints described with WS-Security go beyond individual messages and it
is possible relate several messages in the same conversation.
WS-Policy specifies an XML-based language to express the different security policies that are allowed and offered by a
given entity. It is a flexible way to describe what kind ofWS-Security structures are supported by theWS in the exchanged
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Fig. 4. Different deployments of service systems with WS-Security.
SOAP messages. For instance, it serves to specify all the different encryption algorithms that are supported by the service
provider over the different parts of the SOAP message.
Example 3. Listing 1 presents a SOAP message composed of: a timestamp (line 3); an X.509 certificate (lines 4-6); an
encrypted key (#enc1 at lines 7–11); the signature of the timestamp and the body of the message (lines 12–26), which is
signed with the key given in the previous certificate (referenced in lines 21–25); and the body encrypted with the #enc1
key (lines 29–31).
All theseWS-* specificationsmust be knownand considered by the architect in order to design a proper orchestration that
is able to comply with the security requirements of all the services involved. Moreover, the mechanisms presented in WS-*
security specifications do notmake the communication secure. A SOAPmessagewithWS-Security elements can specify that
certain part is encrypted but the encryption key can be also sent as clear text, for instance. WS-* security specifications do
enable security concerns but they can be misused so careful design, analysis and verification are required to ensure certain
security properties over the whole orchestration.
Fig. 4 shows several ways of deploying Web Services which use WS-Security SOAP messages. The most common way
(WS 1) involves the definition of the service without security, only its signature and behaviour are described. If the service
provider offering that WS has a WS-Policy defined over the SOAP messages exchanged by that service, the provider must
have WS-Security descriptions to comply with that WS-Policy. These WS-Security descriptions of the SOAP message are
part of the configuration of security interceptors that capture all SOAP messages and recompose them according to those
WS-Security descriptions. These security interceptors require security token services (either local to the service provider
or as a third party service) which provide them with WS-Trust mechanisms. The first services that were deployed with
WS-Security SOAP messages did not have engines with security interceptors, therefore WS-Security was hardwired within
the service logic (WS 2). Finally, there are services without any security (WS 3) that might want to cooperate with security
enabled engines. In this scenario, security adaptors could be used as (1) security interceptors, (2) to adaptWeb Services with
incompatible WS-Security descriptions, and (3) to support services without security capabilities.
3.2. Service behaviour with security specifications
WS-Security defines XML elements for keys, encryption, signature and certificates. This functionality can be abstracted
from implementation details to a small set of security primitives. These primitives will be used in our model for service
behaviour that will integrate the signature, behaviour and security properties of Web Services. Therefore, WS-Security
specifications over SOAP messages will be encoded into the labels of service behaviours. We refer to these security-enabled
labels as security specifications.
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Definition 1 (Security specification). A security specification is an expression consisting of security constructors, atoms and
types.
S(∈ SecSpec) ::= a ∈ Atom % Operation name
| p ∈ Type % Argument types
| hash(S) % Digest
| pk(S) % Asymmetric key pair
| enc(S, S) % Symmetric encryption
| penc(S, S) % Asymmetric encryption
| cat(S, . . . , S) % List
Constructor pk represents the public key of a given private key. Constructor hash represents the digest of any given
data. Symmetric encryption is covered by the enc constructor and, analogously, constructor penc is used for asymmetric
encryption. Lists are also allowed through cat but this constructor will be considered implicit throughout the rest of the
paper. Atoms (Atom) within a security specification are used asmessage selectors. They serve to express the operation name
of the message but we allow them to be in several parts of the specification and nested within security constructors, hence
we allow the operation name to be subject to any security operation, such as encryption or digest. The elements of Type
characterise the abstract type of the run-time values they represent. Type could be actual implementation types, semantic
annotations or any other type identifier.
The semantics behind security constructors determinewhether their arguments can be accessed or not. The cat construc-
tor does not obfuscate its arguments, whereas the arguments of pk and hash cannot be accessed. We assume that knowing
a private asymmetric key/value it is possible to obtain its public pair/digest, but not the opposite. Constructors enc and penc
have their corresponding inverse operations that, when evaluated with the right keys, return the message.
[[dec(k, enc(k,m))]] = m
[[pdec(pk(k), penc(k,m))]] = m
[[pdec(k, penc(pk(k),m))]] = m
In this way, [[·]] represents the value of a security expression.
The security specification which represents the pair of an asymmetric key is given by pair : SecSpec → SecSpec.
pair(S) .=
{
S ′ if S = pk(S ′)
pk(S) otherwise (pair)
Example 4. The WS-Security message in Listing 1 complies with the following security specification.
S0 = tstamp,
info, pk(akey), penc(akey, hash(info, pk(akey))),
enc(key, key),
hash(tstamp), hash(body),
penc(akey, hash(hash(tstamp), hash(body))),
enc(key, body)
In this example, no operation name (i.e., atom) is present as it was omitted in theWS-Security code. The different elements
of the list have been indented to see their corresponding parts in Listing 1. It is worth noticing that the X.509 certificate
has been expanded to be able to reference its components: information about the certificate (info), the certified public key
(pk(akey)) and the signature of the previous elements by a certification authority (penc(akey, hash(info, pk(akey)))). This
signature consists of the encryption of the hash value of signed elements (the information and the public key) with the
private key of the certification authority. A similar structure is found in the signature of the hash values of the body and the
timestamp. This notation abstracts implementation details (e.g., the specific algorithms applied) but it manages to represent
the different parts of security tokens such as certificates and signatures.
We model service behaviour as a LTS [21] restricted as follows.
Definition 2 (Security-enabled service behaviour). A security-enabled service behaviour is formally defined as a LTS〈
,O, st0, F, t
〉
where:  ⊆ {τ } ∪ ({!, ?} × SecSpec) is an alphabet which corresponds to the set of labels associated
to transitions, O is a set of states, st0 ∈ O is the initial state, F ⊆ O are final states, and t ⊆ (O ×  × O) are the transitions.
The labels in  are either internal transitions (τ ) or communication transitions that contain an initial ‘!’ or ‘?’ if they are
output or input actions, respectively, followed by an element of SecSpec. For each service we will assume a unique service
identifier serv ∈ SId, and (s, l, s′) ∈ t will be denoted by s l−→serv s′.
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Thismodelwas chosenbecause it is simple, graphical, and it canbeeasily derived fromexisting implementation languages
(see for instance [9,11,12,23]where such abstractions forWeb Serviceswere used for verification, composition or adaptation
purposes). Alternatively, we could model services using process algebras such as CCS [16] or a subset of the π-calculus [17]
as some of the authors did in previouswork [3,4]. However, we do not need their expressiveness in thiswork sowe represent
services with simpler LTSs.
Example 5. The services in Fig. 5 are an evolution of previous examples with amore elaborated behaviour and a new service
(ca) which plays the role of a Security Token Service that provides the system with the means to generate session keys.
Services c and d maintain most of the incompatibilities mentioned in Section 2 and have some new ones related to their
incompatible restrictions in security. For instance, service c uses a previously shared key (key) for symmetric encryption
of requests and replies, whereas d requires a Security Context Token (the argument of the login message), which contains
an encrypted session key. Furthermore, the replies expected by c must be encrypted (even the operation name) and the
integrity of the data confirmed with their digest. On the other hand, d uses nonces to avoid message duplication attacks,
i.e., it expects to receive random data in every request and it replies with that same data so requests and replies can be
correlated. Service ca must receive the identification of the service which wants to start a secure conversation followed by
a password and the identification of the destination service, both encrypted with the public key of ca. Then, it returns two
tokens encryptedwith its private key, one for each service, which contain the new session key encryptedwith the symmetric
keys of the source and destination services (keys previously known to ca).
At run time, the values exchanged between the adaptor and the services are defined as Data, which must comply with
their corresponding security specifications in the service behaviour. Data is defined as lists of binary information and atoms.
D(∈ Data) ::= b ∈ Binary | a ∈ Atom | (D, . . . ,D)
Fig. 5. Behaviour of some security-enabled services.
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Let us recall that atoms are used as message selectors, e.g., operation names.
In order to compose security-enabled messages, we can evaluate any expression composed of security primitives and
Data. These executable expressions are called security expressions.
Definition 3 (Security expression). A security expression is a security specification with decryption primitives (dec and pdec)
where all the types are replaced by data and it complies with the following grammar.
X(∈ SExp) ::= D ∈ Data
| hash(X) | pk(X) | enc(X, X) | cat(X, . . . , X)
| dec(X, X) % Symmetric decryption
| penc(X, X) % Asymmetric encryption
| pdec(X, X) % Asymmetric decryption
Security expressions can be computed using function [[·]] : SExp → Data.
Let usnote that securityprimitivesmighthave collisions in the following scenarios: (i) twodifferent valueswhichgenerate
the samedigest, (ii) twoprivate asymmetric keyswhich share the samepublic key, and (iii) twodifferent encryptedmessages
which correspond to the sameclear textwhendecryptedwith the samekey.We refer to security primitiveswithout collisions
as sound security primitives.
Definition 4 (Sound security primitives). Security primitives pk, penc and hash are considered sound security primitives if:
[[pk(D1)]] = [[pk(D2)]] (1)
[[hash(D1)]] = [[hash(D2)]] (2)
[[penc(D0,D1)]] = [[penc(D0,D2)]] (3)
for all D0,D1 = D2 ∈ Data.
4. Security adaptation
Weuse security contract terms to represent the input and output actions in the adaptor ofWS-Security enabledmessages
coming from/to the services. These terms are used to receive and process messages, or to compose and send messages from
the adaptor, and they are combined in a security adaptation contract.
Security adaptation contracts allow to: (i) express the security checks thatmust be performed by the adaptor; (ii) describe
how to decompose and recompose the messages that must be transformed by the adaptor while preserving the security
restrictions of the services; (iii) define security constraints among sequences ofmessages, such as secure sessions or security
protocols; (iv) perform analysis over the security of the resulting orchestration against several attacks; and (v) retain the
ability to adapt signature and behavioural incompatibilities.
Behavioural adaptation involves receiving themessages and sending themat themoment andwith the structure expected
by the intended recipient. This recomposition ofmessages is achieved by symbolic parameters, which specify how the data is
received and how the datamust be restructured before being sent. However, in security enabledWS, reception and emission
of the WS-Security messages is more complex as these messages might need integrity, confidentiality and authentication
over parts of themessage or all of themessage. Therefore, the adaptormust be capable of verifying that themessages received
complywith the security policy of the sender; itmust decrypt those parts of themessages thatmust be recomposed tomatch
the structure acceptedby the receiver; andfinally send themessages encrypted andauthenticated as expectedby thepartner.
Example 6. Fig. 6 shows the security contract which solves the example in Fig. 5. At the beginning of the contract, vector
vtok receives the first request from service cwhich contains its service identifier (S), its password (P, which is encrypted by a
symmetric key C∧ that must be previously known by the adaptor), and the actual request (R). For the adaptor to successfully
interact with the Security Token Service ca, it must know in advance the service identifier of service d (parameter T∧) and
the public key of ca (PK∧); both of them are used in the left-hand side of vtok to request context security tokens (O and
pencd(PK
∧, enc(C∧, K))). The purpose of these context security tokens is to distribute a shared key (authenticated by ca)
between services c and d. These context security tokens are encrypted with the private asymmetric key of ac (and therefore
authenticated) and contain the shared key (K) to be used as session key. This session key is also encrypted with symmetric
keys previously shared between each service and ca. These context security tokens are received in the right-hand side of
vlog . One of them (O) is forwarded to service d in the other side of the vector, while the other will be used by the adaptor on
behalf of service c, which does not support Security Token Services, to obtain the session key K .
Then, in vreq1, the request contained in R (which was previously received in vtok) is sent to service d. This request must
have an attached instantiated nonce (N∗) which is also encrypted with the session key (K∧, received in the previous context
J.A. Martín, E. Pimentel / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 80 (2011) 154–179 165
Fig. 6. Security adaptation contract for services c and d.
security token) as expected by the destination service. This nonce must be the same as the one received in the reply (N∧
in vres′ ). The data coming from this reply (D) will be encrypted and digested (enc(C∧,“reply”,D∧, hash(D∧))) before being
sent to service c.
From this point on (due to VLTS1) all further requests proceed through vreq2 which, apart from all the re-encryptions and
nonces that must be dealt with, it also checks that the service identifier (S∧) and password (P∧) sent by c are the same as
the first request that started the communication.
The environment E0 in Fig. 6(c) is the initial environment for the adaptor corresponding to contract C1. The notation of
the substitutions imply that parameters on the right-hand side of the slash are replaced by whatever is on the left-hand
side. Parameters PK, C and T are the public key of ca, the private key of service c (needed for decrypting its requests and
encrypting the replies in vtok , vreq2 and vres), and the identifier of service d, respectively. In substitution θ , the elements
x, y, z ∈ Data represent binary data corresponding to the stored values referenced by the parameters.
Security adaptation can be achieved using a security adaptor either in a transparent way or as a visible third party
in between the communication, although the former implies that the adaptor must know some sensitive information to
perform its task. If the adaptor is transparent to the WSs, it must know some of their private security tokens in order to
recompose messages reusing those same tokens. If the adaptor is perceived as a third party, it has its own security tokens,
and trust must be handled (throughWS-Trust, for instance) between the adaptor and theWSs. Either way, the adaptor must
be enabledwith security token generation capabilities as itmight need to generate session keys, timestamps and signed data
to be able to adapt the conversation among the services. The adaptor works as a proxy or central orchestrator that acts as a
gateway among different WS-Policies. The security adaptors presented in this work support both transparent and opaque
approaches.
Let us focus on single input or output actions. These are not straightforward when security primitives are involved since
we have to use them differently depending on the direction of themessage. In output actions, only constructors are required
to compose the message but, in input actions, both constructors (for comparison against known data) and their inverse
operations (for decomposing the message) are needed. Following the design of WS-Security and the model presented in
Section 3, in order to simplify the comparison between contract terms and security specifications we are only going to use
constructors in contract terms. In input actions, pk and hash cannot be deconstructed, cat does not obfuscate its contents and
the first argument of enc specifies unambiguously how to decrypt it, therefore the inverse operation of their constructors can
be inferred. However, due to the asymmetric nature of public-key cryptography, we have to annotate whether the specified
asymmetric keymust beused for decryptionor encryption. Thiswill be annotated as subscripts of the asymmetric encryption
constructor, pencd and pencc , respectively (see Definition 5).
4.1. Security contract terms
Encoding WS-Security descriptions into elements of SecSpec, we gain the types of the message (e.g., which part of the
message is a key, is encrypted or is a hash value) but we lose all the references between the elements of the message (such
as which part of the message contains the key which encrypts another message or where is the digest of a given argument).
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However, we retain this capability using symbolic parameters in security adaptation contracts. Symbolic parameters enable
us not only to relate arguments among different services but also to relate arguments of the same service, even within the
same message (which is useful for relating arguments with their signatures or hash values). Security specifications where
all the types are replaced by symbolic parameters (or parameters, for short) are called contract terms.
Definition 5 (Contract term). A contract term is a security specification where all the types are replaced by symbolic para-
meters.
T (∈ CTerm) ::= a ∈ Atom | P ∈ Param
| hash(T ) | pk(T ) | enc(T , T ) | cat(T , . . . , T )
| pencc(T , T ) % Asymmetric encryption
| pencd(T , T ) % Asymmetric decryption
Within contract terms, constructors for asymmetric encryption have a subscript specifying whether it is going to be
used for decrypting (pencd) or encrypting (pencc) messages. Function pm : CTerm → {Param} returns the set of symbolic
parameters within a given contract term.
Example7.The following contract term is used for composing securedmessageswhichmatchwith theWS-Security example
in Listing 1.
T0 = T,
I, pk(S), pencc(A, hash(I, pk(S))),
enc(K, L),
hash(T), hash(B),
pencc(S, hash(hash(T), hash(B))),
enc(L, B)
Security specifications (like S0) describe the security structure and types of the message, whereas contract terms (such as
T0) relate each part of the message while respecting the structure imposed by security specifications. For instance, S in T0
is the parameter for the key in the X.509 certificate and it is used three times: once to specify the actual key, the second
time to refer to its digest within the certificate, and finally to specify that the key is used in the signature of the digests of
the timestamp and the body. Similarly, the encrypted key L is used a second time to specify that the body of the message is
encrypted with such key. Symbolic parameters T, B and I are referenced several times by their digests.
4.2. The environment of the security adaptor
At run time, the adaptor receives messages and matches them against contract terms. The data in the messages are
matched with symbolic parameters. These parameters will be used to reference these data. The adaptor has an environ-
ment to store these pairs of parameter-data. In addition, the values sent by the services comply with their corresponding
security specifications in the behaviour of the services. When a parameter is matched at run time, both the value and its
corresponding security specification are stored in the environment within the adaptor. Therefore, this environment is com-
posed of two substitutions: σ , which partially replaces parameters with their corresponding security specification; and θ ,
which partially replaces parameters with the data they represent. Substitution σ will be used to transform contract terms
into security specifications and θ will be used to evaluate contract terms into actual messages to be exchanged at run
time.
Definition 6 (Adaptor environment). An adaptor environment is a pair of partial substitutions E = 〈σ, θ 〉 of typeσ : Param →
SecSpec and θ : Param → Data. Both substitutions in an environment have the same domain, 3 dom(σ ) = dom(θ).
We will denote by σE and θE the corresponding substitutions σ and θ in the environment E. We will denote as Env the
set of all possible environments.
Substitution θ is used for composing messages on output actions in the adaptor, and comparing received data against
previously known data, whereas σ is used to infer which transformations are allowed on the data, and to check that the
security specification of composed messages is as expected by the receiving service.
The substitutions σ and θ of the environment are updated with the operator ‘
’. For instance, in σ 
 σ ′, substitution σ ′
takes precedence over σ .
3 Notice that substitutions are partial mappings on parameters. Thus, the domain of a substitution is composed of only those parameters which are actually
replaced.
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It is worth observing that environments might not be empty at the beginning of the protocol of the adaptor. The reason
for this is that security adaptors might need some initial data (such as public keys) in order to engage the communication
properly.
Contract terms can be transformed into security expressions (SExp, in Definition 3) using an environment with enough
information to substitute every symbolic parameter in the contract term with its corresponding data. Therefore, with the
appropriate environment, contract terms can be evaluated into data using this transformation.
Definition 7 (Contract term value). The value of a Contract term T with regard to substitution θ : Param → Data such that
pm(T ) ⊆ dom(θ), denoted by |T |θ , is inductively defined as follows:
|a|θ .= a
|P|θ .= θ(P)
|pk(T1)|θ .= [[pk(|T1|θ )]]
|hash(T1)|θ .= [[hash(|T1|θ )]]
|enc(T1, T2)|θ .= [[enc(|T1|θ , |T2|θ )]]
|pencc(T1, T2)|θ .= [[penc(|T1|θ , |T2|θ )]]
|cat(T1, . . . , Tn)|θ .= (|T1|θ , . . . , |Tn|θ )
(|T |θ )
where a ∈ Atom, P ∈ Param and Ti ∈ CTerm, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Let us note that contract term values are used to compose messages, therefore asymmetric decryption (pencd) is not
required in the definition.
Symbolic parameters can be annotated4 to express how they are affected by security restrictions and the environment.
Parameters that must be compared to a previously known value by the adaptor (such as nonces) will be annotated with
‘∧’. These parameters are called known parameters. Contract terms that are used for sending messages from the adaptor
typically have all their parameters annotated as knownparameters, since the arguments of amessagemust be available in the
environmentbefore themessage is sent. Thoseargumentswhosevaluemustbegeneratedby theadaptor (suchasnewsession
keys and timestamps) will be replaced by parameters annotated with ‘∗’, we call these parameters instantiated parameters.
All other unannotated parameters are called fresh parameters and their values will be updated in the environment when a
matching message is received. Contract terms can also contain anonymous parameters (‘_’) that are used when the values
received in these parameters are not needed for the rest of the communication, hence they are ignored. In short, anonymous
parameters are the same as one-time-use fresh parameters and they will be dealt with as such for the rest of the paper.
Symbolic parameters (P ∈ Param) are evaluated by the substitutions in the environment to obtain their corresponding
security specifications (σ(P)) and run-time values (θ(P)). However, these substitutions can be restricted to annotated
parameters with a superscript (e.g., σ f , σ∧ and σ ∗ substitute only fresh, known and instantiated parameters, respectively).
Function pm (in Definition 5) can also be restricted to annotated parameters in the same way.
4.3. Security adaptation contracts
Definition8 (Security adaptation vector). A security adaptation vector (or security vector, for short) for a set of security-enabled
services is an element of SVector = VTerm ∪ (VTerm × VTerm)where VTerm = SId × {?, !} × CTerm. Such a vector is noted〈
s :! T 〉, 〈s :? T 〉, 〈s :? T ; s′ :! T ′〉, or 〈s :! T ; s′ :? T ′〉where s = s′ are service identifiers and T , T ′ are contract terms for any
security specification in their respective interfaces.
Definition 9 (Security adaptation contract). A security adaptation contract (or security contract, for short) of a set of services
is a triple
〈
V, VLTS, E0
〉
where V is a set of security vectors over the services, VLTS is a vector-LTS over the vectors of V , and E0
is the initial environment of the adaptor which contains the initial security tokens required to perform the adaptation.
The adaptor must compose messages according to the security specification expected by the destination service. Analo-
gously, the adaptor will receive and decompose messages according to the security specification expected from the sender.
Messages are composed/received based on a given contract term, therefore we define first how to relate contract termswith
security specifications by replacing parameters with elements of SecSpec, and then we define when a given contract term is
able to match a security specification using the previous relation.
Definition 10 (Contract term to security specification). The security specification corresponding to a contract term T with
regard to a substitution σ : Param → SecSpec, denoted by [T ]σ , is defined as follows:
4 Definition 4.1 is not complete since none of its parameters are annotated accordingly. However, Fig. 4 makes extensive use of parameter annotations.
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[a]σ .= a
[P]σ .= σ(P)
[pk(T1)]σ .= pk([T1]σ )
[hash(T1)]σ .= hash([T1]σ )
[enc(T1, T2)]σ .= enc([T1]σ , [T2]σ )
[pencc(T1, T2)]σ .= penc([T1]σ , [T2]σ )
[pencd(T1, T2)]σ .= penc(pair([T1]σ ), [T2]σ )
[cat(T1, . . . , Tn)]σ .= cat([T1]σ , . . . , [Tn]σ )
([T ]σ )
where Ti ∈ CTerm, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; a ∈ Atom; P ∈ Param; and σ : Param → SecSpec.
Notice that we used the appropriate pair of keys to generate the security specification in asymmetric cryptography
primitives due to the duality pencc/pencd in contract terms, which is not present in security specifications.
Definition 11 (Contract termmatching). A contract termmatcheswith a security specification, denoted by S  T , if and only
if a substitution σ : Param → SecSpec exists such that [T ]σ = S .
As the next result shows, if S  T , the substitution σ verifying [T ]σ = S is unique.
Proposition 1. Given a contract term T which matches a security specification (S  T ), if two substitutions σ1, σ2 enable this
match ([T ]σ1 = [T ]σ2 = S), then
σ1(P) = σ2(P)
for all P ∈ pm(T ).
Thus, we will denote by σS,T the unique substitution such that S  T and dom(σS,T ) = pm(T ).
Example 8. Let T1 and S1 be a contract term and a security specification, respectively, given by:
T1 = “reqToken”, pencd(PK, enc(C, K)),O
S1 = “reqToken”, penc(akey, enc(key, key)), penc(akey, enc(key, key))
Then, we can easily derive that S1  T1 with the following substitution:
σS1,T1 = {pk(akey)/PK, key/C, key/K, penc(akey, enc(key, key))/O}
It is worth noticing how the constructor pencd in T1 is removed from its subindex, and its key (PK, σS1,T1(PK) = pk(akey))
is replaced with its private pair:
pair([PK]σS1,T1 ) = akey
In this way, even though the contract term expressed which asymmetric key was necessary to decrypt the message, the
same contract term is rewritten and compared with the security specification which composed that very message (S1).
4.4. Synchronisation between security adaptors and Web Services
Prior to the output of messages from the adaptor, it must be checked that all the parameters required to compose the
message are available within the environment (E = 〈σ, θ 〉) and that their corresponding security specifications (σ ) comply
with those expected by the recipient. This comparison between a security specification and a contract term with a given
environment is called synchronisation trigger as it will pose the condition to trigger security vectors.
Definition12 (Synchronisation trigger). Acontract termT canbe triggeredbyasecurity specificationS inagivenenvironment
E = 〈σ, θ 〉 when the security specifications in σ are in such state that all the known parameters of T can be substituted to
match S . That is,
σ(P) = σS,T (P)
for all P ∈ pm∧(T ).
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Notice that a contract term T can only be triggered when it matches a security specification S  T . We will denote as
S σ T such a trigger condition.
Example 9. Let us assume S2 ∈ SecSpec and T2 ∈ CTerm given by:
S2 = “request”, req, enc(key, nonce) σ = {}
T2 = “request”, _, enc(K∧,N) σ ′ = {key/K}
then
S2 σ T2, S2 σ ′ T2
Receptions at the adaptor are triggered by Definition 12 but, in addition, once all the data in themessage are received, the
adaptor must check that these data satisfy the restrictions imposed by the contract term that allowed the communication.
If this security check fails, then the adaptor must evolve to an exceptional behaviour where specific actions should be taken
to solve the problem (e.g., ignore every other communication with that service and restart its own behaviour). This check is
performed recomposing themessage with the expected data (atoms and known parameters) filling the gaps with the values
received in fresh parameters and comparing this recomposed message to the one received.
Definition 13 (Security check). Some data D comply with the security checks expressed in a contract term T with a substi-
tution θ (denoted by D |θ T ) when T can be evaluated to have the same value as D using θ . Formally,
a |θ a
D |θ P iff D = θ(P)
D |θ pk(T1) iff |pk(T1)|θ = D
D |θ hash(T1) iff |hash(T1)|θ = D
D |θ enc(T1, T2) iff [[dec(|T1|θ ,D)]] |θ T2
D |θ pencc(T1, T2) iff |pencc(T1, T2)|θ = D
D |θ pencd(T1, T2) iff [[pdec(|T1|θ ,D)]] |θ T2
(D1 · · ·Dn) |θ cat(T1 · · · Tn) iff Di |θ Ti, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(|θ )
where Ti ∈ CTerm, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; a ∈ Atom; P ∈ Param.
When data D pass the security checks of contract T , the substitution θ such that D |θ T is univocally determined by
security primitives, if they do not present any collision. This is what is stated by next proposition.
Proposition 2. Given a fixed set of keys and sound security primitives, if D |θ T then θ is unique on pm(T ).
The environment of the adaptor evolves after every communication with any service. When messages are received and
successfully validated, the environment is updatedwith the data received in fresh parameters.Whenmessages are sent from
the adaptor, any instantiated parameter must be stored in the environment as well. Any communication (input or output
actions) between the adaptor and the services is called synchronisation.
An adaptor able to engage a security conversation must be able to generate some security tokens such as timestamps,
signatures and session keys. This scenario is covered by WS-Trust and WS-SecureConversation where the adaptor could
be a Security Token Service or it could use another service in the orchestration as its Security Token Service. Either way,
instantiated parameters (i.e., parameters annotated with ‘∗’) in a contract term T fall within this category of tokens. This
instantiation process (inst : SecSpec×CTerm → {Param → Data}) proceeds by associating new values to every instantiated
parameter by means of new data substitutions (θ : Param → Data). Thus, for all θ ∈ inst(S, T ), dom(θ) = pm∗(T ). Only
parameters referring to types can be instantiated, i.e., for all P ∈ dom(θ), σS,T (P) ∈ Type. It does not make sense to
instantiate parameters which refer to structured security specifications (e.g., P such that σS,T (P) = hash(info)). If there are
no instantiated parameters, function inst returns a set with a single empty substitution.
Definition 14 (Synchronisation). A contract term T triggered by specification S transforms the current environment of the
adaptor
〈
σ, θ
〉 ∈ Envonoutput actionswithS,T : Env → {(Data, Env)}, and input actionswithS,T : Data×Env → {Env}:
S,T (
〈
σ, θ
〉
)
.= {(|T |θ ′∗
θ∧ , 〈σ 
 σS,T , θ 
 θ ′〉) | θ ′ ∈ inst(S, T )} ()
S,T (D,
〈
σ, θ
〉
)
.=
{〈
σ 
 σS,T , θ 
 θ ′〉
∣∣∣∣∣
D |θ ′f 
θ∧ T ,
dom(θ ′) = pmf (T )
}
()
170 J.A. Martín, E. Pimentel / Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 80 (2011) 154–179
Example 10. Given the following environment, security specification and contract terms, and being x, y, y′, z ∈ Data:
S3 = “request”, req, enc(key, nonce) T3 = “request”, R∧, enc(K∧,N∗)
T ′3 = “request”, R, enc(K∧,N∧)
σ = {key/K, req/R} θ = {x/K, y/R}
then
(|T3|θ ′∗
θ∧ , 〈σ ′, θ ′〉) ∈ S3,T3(〈σ, θ 〉)〈
σ ′, θ ′′
〉 ∈ S3,T ′3 (D, 〈σ ′, θ ′〉) iff D |θ ′′f 
θ ′∧ T ′3
where
σ ′ = σ 
 {key/K, req/R, nonce/N} θ ′ = θ 
 {z/N}
θ ′′ = θ ′ 
 {y′/R}
As it can be observed in the previous example, the environment transformation made by  depends on how θ ′′ satisfies
the security check on T ′3 . Actually, this transformation is fully determined by data D when security primitives behave as
expected. In fact, in this situation the transformation  is exactly determined for the received data and the environment,
that is, the adaptor evolves to at most one environment. This is formalised in the following result, a direct consequence of
Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. If the security primitives are sound then |S,T (D, E)| ≤ 1 for a fixed set of keys.
In the case of output actions, the environment transformationS,T (E) returns asmany environments as possible instan-
tiations can bemade over the parameters of T . That implies that, if there are no instantiated parameters in T , transformation
 is exactly determined by a given environment E, that is, there is only one possible transformation, at most. This is stated
by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If a given contract term T does not have any instantiated parameters (i.e., pm∗(T ) = ∅), then |S,T (E)| ≤ 1.
4.5. Validation of contract terms
Adaptation contracts are easier to design than programming adaptors from scratch. Adaptation contractsmust bewritten
with care [7], otherwise they might be invalid or result in empty adaptors. This is particularly important with security
adaptation contracts since we are able to write contract terms that do not match their corresponding security specification
(covered in Definition 11), or contract terms which contain parameters that cannot be matched on input actions because
their values might be obfuscated by security. In order to prevent the latter we define the reachability of parameters and, at
the same time, we define valid contract terms.
Definition15 (Parameter reachability). The function reach : Param×CTerm×CTerm → Boolean returnswhether aparameter
P can be obtained from a message that complies with the given contract term or not.
reach(P, T , T ′) .=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
True if T = P
reach(P, T2, T ′) ∧ ∀P′ ∈ pmf (T1).reach(P′, T ′, T ′) if T = enc(T1, T2)
reach(P, T2, T ′) ∧ ∀P′ ∈ pmf (T1).reach(P′, T ′, T ′) if T = pencd(T1, T2)
n∨
i=1
reach(P, Ti, T ′) if T = cat(T1, . . . , Tn)
False otherwise
(reach)
where T , T ′ ∈ CTerm.
Function reach is used on the fresh parameters in input actions, therefore there is no need for including pencc in the
definition.
It is worth noting the role played by the third argument (T ′) which represents the whole contract term of which the
second argument is a part. This argument allows us to look for fresh parameters in other parts of the contract term. In
this way, even though keys might be represented by contract terms with fresh parameters, these keys can still be obtained
(therefore allowing us to keep looking inside the encrypted message) if those fresh parameters can be reached in any other
part of the message. Thus, we will define reachable(P, T ) .= reach(P, T , T ).
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Example 11. Being P ∈ Param, T ∈ CTerm then:
reachable(P, enc(K, P)) = False (4)
reachable(P, cat(enc(K, P), K)) = True (5)
reachable(P, hash(P)) = False (6)
reachable(P, cat(hash(P), K, pencd(pk(K), P)) = True (7)
In (4), parameter P is within an encryptedmessagewith an unreachable key, therefore themessage cannot be decrypted and
the parameter is unreachable. If the key is given in any other part of the message (5), parameter P can be reached. Digests
cannot be decomposed so P cannot be reached in (6). Finally in (7), we can reach K therefore we can obtain its public key
and then we reach P.
We now define two notions of valid contract term over a given security specification S depending on whether the given
contract term T is used for output (validSend) or input (validRec) actions in the adaptor. Contract term T is considered
valid only if S  T . Additionally, on input actions, every fresh parameter must be reachable and, on output actions, every
parameter must be annotated to be known or instantiated. Instantiations must assign values to parameters according to
their types.
Definition 16 (Valid contract term). A contract term T is considered valid with regard to a security specification S and the
direction of the action if:
validSend(T , S) iff
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
S  T ,
pmf (T ) = ∅,
∀P ∈ pm∗(T ) · σS,T (P) ∈ Type
(validSend)
validRec(T , S) iff
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
S  T ,
pm∗(T ) = ∅,
∀P ∈ pmf (T ) · reachable(P, T )
(validRec)
Example 12. Given
S4 = enc(key, “reply”, data, hash(data))
T4 = enc(C∧, “reply”,D∧, hash(D∧))
T5 = enc(C∧, “reply”,D∧, hash(D))
T6 = enc(C, “reply”,D∧, hash(D∧))
T7 = enc(C∧, “reply”,D, hash(D∧))
T8 = enc(C∗, “reply”,D∧, hash(D∧))
T9 = hash(D∧)
then
validRec(T4, S4) = True validSend(T4, S4) = True
validRec(T5, S4) = False validSend(T5, S4) = False
validRec(T6, S4) = False validSend(T6, S4) = False
validRec(T7, S4) = True validSend(T7, S4) = False
validRec(T8, S4) = False validSend(T8, S4) = True
validRec(T9, S4) = False validSend(T9, S4) = False
4.6. Behaviour of adapted systems
Being given a security contract term and a set of services we can generate the behaviour of the adaptor which complies
with the contract and makes the orchestration to avoid deadlocks. The automatic generation of such adaptation behaviour
has been addressed in related work [3,6,8,15] but the approaches presented in these papers did not consider security
adaptation. We argue that these approaches could be extended to support security adaptation contracts and we present
the intuition behind this extension in the algorithm presented in Appendix B. This algorithm proceeds by generating every
possible service communication allowed by the security adaptation contract, and then it selectively prune those controllable
branches which present deadlocks or livelocks. Therefore, the adaptor is guaranteed to be transparent due to the exhaustive
nature of the generation algorithm.
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Definition 17 (Adaptor behaviour). The behaviour of the adaptor is defined as a LTS
〈
a,Oa, st
a
0, Fa,−→adapt
〉
where a ⊆
VTerm is the alphabet, Oa is the set of states, st
a
0 ∈ Oa is the initial state, Fa ⊆ Oa are the final states, and −→adapt⊆
(Oa × a × Oa) is the labelled transition relation.
An adaptor behaviour is compliant with a security adaptation contract C = 〈V, VLTS, E0〉where V ⊆ {VTerm∪ (VTerm×
VTerm)} if: the labels of the adaptor behaviour are the vector terms (VTerm) of C; the sequences of transitions respect the
restrictions imposed by the vectors (V) and VLTS in C; the initial environment of the adaptor is E0; and the orchestration
among services and the adaptor do not present deadlocks or livelocks.
Being given an adaptor behaviour as defined above and a set of services, the orchestration behaviour (i.e., the behaviour
of the adapted system) is characterised by a labelled transition system defined as follows.
Definition 18 (Orchestration behaviour). The behaviour of the orchestration among a set of services (servi =〈
i,Oi, st
i
0, Fi,−→i
〉
, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}) and an adaptor (〈a,Oa, sta0, Fa,−→adapt 〉) is a LTS 〈,O, st0, F, T 〉 where the labels
are  ⊆ (Data ∪ {τ, fail}) × (SecSpec ∪ {	}) × (CTerm ∪ {	}); the set of states is O ⊆ O1 × · · · × On × Oa × Env; the
initial state is st0 = {st10 | · · · |stn0 |
〈
sta0, E0
〉}; the final states are F ⊆ F1 × · · · × Fn × Fa × Env; and the transition relation
T ⊆ O ×  × O is inductively defined by the rules in Fig. 7.
Let us note that the transitions of the orchestration are labelled with the exchanged data and the contract term and
security specification which allowed the synchronisation. On τ -transitions, the labels are τ, 	 and 	, respectively. Security
exceptions are labelledwith fail and the initial environment E0 is given in the contract which generated the adaptor. Services
are orchestrated with the adaptor as-they-are, therefore the adaptation is non-intrusive.
The transition relation of the orchestration behaviour is described in two stages: first we define the feasible interac-
tions between a single service and the adaptor in rules TAU, SEND, REC and FAIL, and then we define the orchestration
among n services in PAR rule. By abuse of notation we denote both interactions using the same symbol for the transition
relation
.−→.
During synchronisations through rules SEND, REC and FAIL, both the service and the adaptor must be in states s and
a, respectively, where one of the outgoing transitions satisfies the synchronisation trigger (Definition 12). Once the trigger
condition is met, the synchronisation continues differently depending on the direction of the communication. In output
actions (SEND) the security restrictions are guaranteed by construction (S σE T verifies that the security requirements
of the message are covered by the contract term) so the environment is updated with instantiated parameters () and
the parallel composition of the service and the adaptor progresses. If the synchronisation is the result of a message being
received at the adaptor (REC), the transformation of the environment () might fail if the received data do not comply with
Fig. 7. Rules which define the orchestration behaviour of adapted systems.
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the security specification (FAIL). If the synchronisation fails, the adaptor evolves to an exceptional state (except), otherwise
its environment is updated with the received data and the system progresses.
If the security primitives are sound, by Corollary 1, in REC returns only one environment for the received data. In output
actions (SEND), as a consequence of Proposition 3, we could send as many messages as all the possible instantiations of the
symbolic parameters in pm∗(T ).
Proposition 4. If {s1| · · · |si| · · · |sn|〈a, E〉} D−→ {s1| · · · |s′i| · · · |sn|〈a′, E′〉} as a consequence of applying rule SEND on s !S−→serv
s′ and a serv:?T−−−−→adapt a′, then σE′(P) is a subexpression of S for every P ∈ pm(T ).
Proposition 4 implies that the security specification of the parameters used to compose messages, comply with the
security expected by the destination service.
It is worth noticing that the behaviour defined in Fig. 7 only allows successful communications between the services and
the adaptor on valid contract terms.We understand as successful communications those where the adaptor has not reached
an exceptional state, that is, except in rule FAIL. This is stated by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The premises of rules REC and SEND imply that the contract term T governing the transition of the adaptor is a valid
contract term.
Because of Theorem 1, every contract term that allows successful communications matches the security specification of
the service.
In the following theorem,we demonstrate that the environment of the adaptor is updated on successful communications
(not FAIL) following the contract term matching for security specifications, and the security check for data.
Theorem 2. If {s1| · · · |si| · · · |sn|〈a, E〉} D−−→S T {s1| · · · |s′i| · · · |sn|
〈
a′, E′
〉} then:
σE′ = σE 
 σS,T
θE′ = θE 
 θE′
where θE′ satisfies
D |θE′
θ∧E T and dom(θE′) = pm(T ) − pm∧(T )
The intuition behind the previous theorem is that the data exchanged through the adaptor are verified with regard to the
security checks expressed in the contract termwhich allowed the communication, and complywith the security specification
expected by the service. Therefore, the adaptor is secure.
Example 13. Fig. 8 contains the protocol with the successful transitions of the adaptor corresponding to contract C1 (Fig. 6)
and services c, d and ca (Fig. 5). At the beginning, the adaptor waits for either the quit or the request messages from
service c which trigger vectors vquit and vtok , respectively. On this initial request, vector vreq2 is not trigger because of the
restrictions imposed by VLTS1. Then, the service c awaits a response and the adaptor processes the other half of vector vtok
and transforms the previously received request into a token request for ca. Service ca responses and triggers vlog which
results in a login message being sent from the adaptor to d. Now the adaptor is waiting for service d which can either
deny the service (this triggers vref and sends a refused message to c) or proceed, which is handled by vproc . In the latter
case, the only option available due to the current states of all the services and the adaptor is to use vreq1 and to recompose
the initial request received from c into a request understandable by d using a newly generated nonce (N∗) and the key K
inside the token received from ca. From that point on, the adaptor enters a loop where requests and responses between
c and d are adapted using previously known information by means of vectors vreq2 and vres (nonces and data integrity are
checkedwithN∧ andD∧, hash(D∧) andmessages are encrypted appropriately) until service c decides to finish by triggering
vector vquit .
5. Related work
Several proposals [10,13,15] focus on solving behavioural incompatibilities among services using adaptation contracts.
In [10], the authors presented an approach to behavioural adaptation based on a set of adaptation operations which de-
fined basic relation patterns between message names. They also presented a visual notation for describing the mappings
between services. The authors of [13] focused on dynamic adaptation of BPEL processes using semantic rules. These rules
could be considered as semantic adaptation contracts which, upon the reception of new requests, generate the appropriate
orchestration of services to attend to these requests. Mateescu et al. [15] established the foundations of this work as they
propose a generative approach to adaptors based on regular expressions of vectors with the advantage of using a process
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Fig. 8. Adaptation protocol for contract C1 and services c and d and ca.
algebra encoding andon-the-fly generation techniques.However, all the papersmentioned above lack the support of security
concerns which is the main contribution of this paper.
The problems faced by behavioural Web Service adaptation are similar to those present in the automatic generation of
controllers for composite systems. The authors of [20] aimed at the automatic composition of distributed business processes.
Given a set of BPEL processes and an abstract description of the composition, expressed in their own goal-oriented language
called EaGLe, they are able to automatically generate a controller implemented in BPEL. This controller plays an identical role
to our adaptor. However, there are several differences due to the fact that they specify the compositionwith its goal, whereas
we pay particular attention to the detailed mapping between services expressed in adaptation contracts. This additional
information has allowed us to express and adapt security requirements, something which was not addressed in [20]. In
addition, in order to track and match the information exchanged, they use information about the internal operations of the
services and they use knowledge-level planning techniques [20] to obtain better scalability by abstracting the actual values.
Likewise, our approach handles symbolic values but no internal information of the services is required apart from their
public behaviour.
The security adaptation contracts presented in this work allow us to verify at run time the security requirements over
the messages exchanged and to adapt services with different security policies. As it is stated in WS-Security, messages with
security requirements are not necessarily secure in the face of certain attacks so further mechanisms to prove its security
are required. Security adaptation does not make the orchestration secure against attacks which were not foreseen by the
policies of the services orchestrated and, in fact, it multiplies the points of attack by the amount of services orchestrated.
Therefore, extensive security analysis is required to prove that the orchestration is safe against some attacks. The authors
of [1] proposed two approaches to express and prove secrecy properties of security protocols, one based on type systems
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and another based on logic programming. The security constructors used by the security adaptation contracts presented
in this work are taken from theirs, so both approaches perform a generic treatment of cryptographic operations and the
orchestrations obtained by our approach could be easily verified by their work.
Deployment of security adaptors is a particularly important issue because, depending on the locationwhere the adaptor is
deployed, one or several of the service security policieswill prevail in themedium. One application for thework presented in
this paper is to generate security adaptors as wrappers [22] for services without security capabilities in order to orchestrate
them within a security enabled system. In this scenario, wrappers have been imposed by the orchestrator to make the
communication secure but, on the service provider side, they must verify that the wrappers to be deployed do not interfere
with their system or pose any security risk. In this situation, Proof Carrying Code [18] is a promising solution where an
untrusted third-party can generate the adaptation code corresponding to a given security adaptation contract. This security
contract serves as the safety policy that must be proved by the adaptor provider, and finally, service providers will be able
to verify the proof against the adaptation contract and the received code before deployment.
Security adaptation contracts are intended to be used at design time to increase the interoperability with legacy ser-
vices or services under different security policies by including security capabilities to behavioural adaptors. Sánchez-Cid et
al. [24] propose a radically different approach where security is not tightly coupled with services but defined as other
compositional entities of the system, therefore allowing the recomposition of the system to achieve different requirements
in security. These security requirements, called S&D Properties, must be addressed throughout every software engineer-
ing stage and are expressed as (i) S&D Classes, highest level of abstraction which deals with concepts such as “use a
confidential channel” or “this information must be authenticated”; (ii) S&D Patterns, which specify classes using a pre-
cise semantic description of the mechanisms that enable a particular S&D Class; and (iii) S&D Implementations, which
are specific algorithms that implement those mechanisms. There are two main advantages of this work that are worth
highlighting: they achieve interoperability through the use of S&D Classes at design time, hence allowing developers to
dynamically choose different S&D Patterns and S&D Implementation at run time; and S&D Patterns allow both static and
dynamic analysis over the security mechanisms they represent. Security adaptation could also be integrated within the
Ref. [24] since adaptors are still needed to cover the gap between the interfaces of S&D Classes and their corresponding
set of S&D Patterns. In addition, services must be S&D-aware, whereas our approach does not require such intrusion in the
services.
6. Conclusions and future work
In this work, we presented an approach to adapt Web Services with stateful behaviour and security requirements in
order to make them cooperate within an orchestration while overcoming their initial incompatibilities at signature, behav-
iour and security QoS levels. This adaptation is achieved through security adaptation contracts which allow the security
requirements of the services to be concisely represented and managed. The formal model applied to security adapta-
tion contracts is based on a set of basic security primitives that support a wide range of security protocols and can be
analysed by automatic cryptographic protocol verifiers. Security adaptation contracts allow us to combine several WS-*
security specifications in a single abstract notation and, at the same time, to solve possible incompatibilities among ser-
vices. Such incompatibilities are common due to the tight coupling of WS-Security enabled services and their security
restrictions.
As regards future work, we plan to work on the possible applications of our approach as security adaptors could be
deployed either as single orchestrators adapting different security policies, or as service wrappers that act as security
interceptors (local to the service provider) applying security properties to unsecured Web Services. Furthermore, we plan
to tackle situations in which adaptors are generated by untrusted parties. In these cases, we intend to use Proof Carrying
Code techniques to use security adaptation contracts as formal specifications of the security requirements expected from
the adaptor.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proposition 1. Given a contract term T which matches a security specification (S  T ), if two substitutions σ1, σ2 enable this
match ([T ]σ1 = [T ]σ2 = S), then
σ1(P) = σ2(P)
for all P ∈ pm(T ).
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Proof. This proposition is demonstrated trivially by induction on the structure of T – see Definition 11 –. 
Proposition 2. Given a fixed set of keys and sound security primitives, if D |θ T then θ is unique on pm(T ).
Proof. We may assume (without loss of generality) that dom(θ1) = dom(θ2) = pm(T) because the statement is made on
pm(T). We will prove the result by reductio ad absurdum, by supposing θ1 = θ2, and then proceeding by induction on the
structure of T .
Base cases. If T is an atom, then the result is trivially satisfied. In fact, dom(θi) = pm(T ) = ∅, and therefore θ1 = θ2.
Analogously, if T is a parameter P, as D |θ1 P and D |θ2 P, then θ1(P) = D = θ2(P). As P is the only parameter in dom(θi),
we have that θ1 = θ2.
Inductive hypothesis. Let us assume that the proposition holds for T1, T2, . . . , Tn. We have to prove the result for
T = {enc(T1, T2), pencd(T1, T2), pencc(T1, T2), hash(T1), pk(T1), cat(T1, T2, . . . , Tn)}.
General cases.We have to consider different cases:
• T = enc(T1, T2). As D |θi enc(T1, T2) (i = 1, 2), then [[dec(|T1|θi ,D)]] |θi T2. As θi (i = 1, 2) use the appropriate
keys, |T1|θ1 = |T1|θ2 . Then, for D1 = |T1|θ1 we have D1 |θi T1, and [[dec(D1,D)]] |θi T2 (i = 1, 2). Therefore, we can
apply the inductive hypothesis on T1 and T2, and the proposition will be satisfied for θ1 and θ2 on pm(T1) ∪ pm(T2).• T = pencd(T1, T2). To prove this case we would proceed in a similar way as the previous case.• T = pencc(T1, T2). As D |θi pencc(T1, T2) (i = 1, 2), then |pencc(T1, T2)|θi = D. That is, [[penc(|T1|θi , |T2|θi)]] = D.
Again, as θi (i = 1, 2) use the appropriate keys, D1|T1|θ1 = |T1|θ2 . By condition 3, D2 = |T2|θ1 = |T2|θ2 . Then, we can
apply the inductive hypothesis on T1 and T2, and the proposition θ1 = θ2 on pm(T1) ∪ pm(T2).• T = pk(T1), T = hash(T1). These two cases can be proved analogously, by applying conditions 1 and 2.• T = cat(T1, T2, . . . , Tn). Finally, to prove the proposition for a sequence of contract terms we only have to apply the
inductive hypothesis to Ti such that θ1 and θ2 are different on at least one of the pm(Ti). 
Corollary 1. If the security primitives are sound then |S,T (D, E)| ≤ 1 for a fixed set of keys.
Proof. Given T ∈ CTerm, S ∈ SecSpec, D ∈ Data and E ∈ Env, if S,T (D, E) has more than one element is because of there
exist two different θ1 and θ2 such that D |θ fi 
θE∧ T with dom(θi) = pm
f (T ) (i = 1, 2) – see Definition 14 –. However,
θ1 = θ2 by Proposition 2, since security primitives are sound. 
Proposition 3. If a given contract term T does not have any instantiated parameters (i.e., pm∗(T ) = ∅), then |S,T (E)| ≤ 1.
Proof. By definition, inst(S, T ) returns a set with a single element (an empty substitution) when pm∗(T ) = ∅. Therefore,
for a given environment E ∈ Env, the transformation S,T (E) – see Definition 14 – returns a set with a single element, at
most. 
Proposition 4. If {s1| · · · |si| · · · |sn|〈a, E〉} D−→ {s1| · · · |s′i| · · · |sn|〈a′, E′〉} as a consequence of applying rule SEND on s !S−→serv
s′ and a serv:?T−−−−→adapt a′, then σE′(P) is a subexpression of S for every P ∈ pm(T ).
Proof. In the premise of rule SEND we have that (D, E′) ∈ S,T (E). Thus, we know that σE′ = σE 
 σS,T by Definition 14,
therefore σE′(P) = σS,T (P) for every P ∈ pm(T ). Thus, by Definition 11, σS,T (P) is a subexpression of S , hence σE′(P) is the
same subexpression. 
Theorem 1. The premises of rules REC and SEND imply that the contract term T governing the transition of the adaptor is a valid
contract term.
Proof. To prove this theorem, we only have to check that rules REC and SEND cannot be applied over invalid contract terms.
Rules REC and SEND are based on a pair of S and T . If T is not valid because S  T – see Definition 16 –, then it does not exist
any σS,T and therefore none of the preconditions of REC and SEND holds. Now we will distinguish between input actions
(REC) and output actions (SEND), by considering the other two conditions in validRec and validSend, respectively:
REC If pm∗(T ) = ∅ then it does not exist any θ ′ such that D |θ ′f 
θE∧ T , since θ ′f 
 θE∧ only valuates fresh and known
parameters, and therefore S,T (D, E) = ∅ and the precondition fails. If any of the free parameters in T is not reachable,
the precondition of REC does not hold.
SEND If there are some fresh parameters in T , |T |θ ′∗
θE∧ is undefined since fresh parameters cannot be evaluated, and
therefore S,T (E) = ∅ and the precondition fails. If the third condition of validSend is not met, then inst(S, T ) = ∅,
S,T (E) = ∅, and the precondition of SEND does not hold. 
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Theorem 2. If {s1| · · · |si| · · · |sn|〈a, E〉} D−−→S T {s1| · · · |s′i| · · · |sn|
〈
a′, E′
〉} then:
σE′ = σE 
 σS,T
θE′ = θE 
 θE′
where θE′ satisfies
D |θE′
θ∧E T and dom(θE′) = pm(T ) − pm∧(T )
Proof. The only rules which allowed data exchange between the adaptor and a service are PAR, REC and SEND. The lat-
ter two have the synchronisation trigger condition (Definition 12) therefore dom(Eθ ) = pm∧(T ). Rule PAR delegates the
communication in REC and SEND so we proceed to demonstrate this theorem based on those two cases:
REC This case is a consequence of E′ ∈ (D, E), which is a premise of rule REC in Fig. 7. In fact, D |θ ′f 
θ∧ T upon
Definition 14, where θ = θE and θ ′ = θE′ due to the restrictions imposed by rule REC. Regarding the domain restriction,
by  we know that dom(θE′) = pmf (T ) and that T does not have any instantiated parameter because it is a valid contract
term for input actions – see Theorem 1 –.
SEND Because of the definition of  , we have that σE′ = σE 
 σS,T . Additionally, dom(θE′) = pm∗(T ) by definition of
inst(S, T ). Contract term T does not have any fresh parameter because it is a valid contract term for output actions. As
(D, E′) ∈ S,T (E) we have that D = |T |θ∗
E′
θ∧E – see Definition 7 –, which are the actual data sent by the adaptor. Thus,
we only have to prove that |T |θ∗
E′
θ∧E |θE′
θ∧E T , but this is directly derived from Definition 13. In fact, the value of T
and the security check – Definition 13 – are inductively analogous for all the possible structures of T but pencd. However,
pencd cannot be present in T because such security primitive is only used on input actions, therefore not applicable to rule
SEND. 
Appendix B. Generation of security adaptors
Considering the transition relation behind orchestrations through security adaptors (Fig. 7), we generate the behaviour
of the adaptor (gen_security_adaptor in Algorithm 1) by first generating every possible successful synchronisation supported
by the contract between the adaptor and the services with Algorithm 2 (gen_all_possible_synchronisations) and then remove
every branch that does not finish in a stable state or presents deadlock situations.We restrict the size of adaptorwith constant
LIMIT to avoid infinite adaptors. Function vterms_in returns all the contract terms in the set of security vectors of the contract,
and function process_τ_transitions simulates the evolution of the system on internal transitions in the services. If there is no
feasible adaptor within the size limit and the given contract and services, gen_security_adaptor returns an empty behaviour.
Algorithm 1 gen_security_adaptor
Generates the behaviour of a security adaptor.
inputs Security-enabled Service interfaces servi = 〈i,Oi, sti0, Fi, Ti〉, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; the security adaptation contract
C = 〈V, VLTS, E0〉 where E0 = 〈σ0, θ0〉 and the security vector-LTS VLTS has an initial state stvlts0 ; and a LIMIT as a boundary
for possible infinite adaptors
output Behaviour of the security adaptor adapt = 〈a,Oa, sta0, Fa, Ta〉 where a ⊆ VTerm. This behaviour is empty if no
security adaptor can be generated for the given inputs.
1: sta0 =
〈
σ0, st
vlts
0 ,∅, {st10, . . . , sti0, . . . , stn0}
〉
2: Oa, Fa, Ta = {sta0},∅,∅
3: adapt = 〈vterms_in(V),Oa, sta0, Fa, Ta〉
4: services = {serv1, . . . , servn}
5: iter = 0
6: {Generate every possible state and transition}
7: while adapt does change and iter < LIMIT do
8: iter = iter + 1
9: adapt = process_τ_transitions(adapt, services)
10: for all a = 〈σ, v, q, ST 〉 ∈ Oa do {For every state in the adaptor}
11: adapt = gen_all_possible_synchronisations(adapt, services, VLTS, a)
12: end for
13: end while
14: adapt = prune_deadlock_branches(adapt)
15: return adapt
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Algorithm 2 gen_all_possible_synchronisations
It explores every possible synchronisation at a given state of the adaptor and the services.
inputs A partial behaviour of a security adaptor adapt = 〈a,Oa, sta0, Fa, Ta〉; the behaviour of the services servi =〈
i,Oi, st
i
0, Fi, Ti
〉
, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}; the security vector-LTS VLTS = 〈vlts,Ovlts, stvlts0 , Fvlts, Tvlts〉 with a ⊆ VTerm and
vlts ⊆ SVector; and an adaptor state a = 〈σ, v, q, ST = {o1, . . . , on}〉 where σ is part of the actual environment of
the adaptor, v ∈ Ovlts is the current state in the vlts, q is a queue of pending synchronisations, and ST is the set of the current
states of the services oi ∈ Oi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
output Extended behaviour of the security adaptor.
1: for all (v
〈
i:!T ;j:?T ′
〉
−−−−−−→ v′), (v
〈
j:?T ′;i:!T
〉
−−−−−−→ v′) ∈ Tvlts : si ∈ ST, si !S−→ s′i ∈ Ti, S σ T ,
〈
σ ′, _
〉 ∈ S,T (_, 〈σ, _〉) do {For
every enabled vector with two sides}
2: ST ′ = (ST − {si}) ∪ {s′i}
3: q′ = enqueue(j :?T ′, q) {Enqueue the output action}
4: a′ = 〈σ ′, v′, q′, ST ′〉
5: Oa = Oa ∪ {a′}
6: Ta = Ta ∪ (a i:?T−−−→ a′)
7: end for
8: for all (v
〈
i:!T
〉
−−−→ v′) ∈ Tvlts : si ∈ ST, si !S−→ s′i ∈ Ti, S σ T ,
〈
σ ′, _
〉 ∈ S,T (_, 〈σ, _〉) do {For every enabled vector with
one output action}
9: ST ′ = (ST − {si}) ∪ {s′i}
10: a′ = 〈σ ′, v′, q, ST ′〉
11: Oa = Oa ∪ {a′}
12: Ta = Ta ∪ (a i:?T−−−→ a′)
13: end for
14: for all (v
〈
i:?T ′
〉
−−−−→ v′) ∈ Tvlts : si ∈ ST, si ?S−−→ s′i ∈ Ti, S σ T , (_,
〈
σ ′, _
〉
) ∈ S,T (〈σ, _〉) do {For every enabled vector
with one input action}
15: ST ′ = (ST − {si}) ∪ {s′i}
16: a′ = 〈σ ′, v′, q, ST ′〉
17: Oa = Oa ∪ {a′}
18: Ta = Ta ∪ (a i:!T−−→ a′)
19: end for
20: for all i :?T ∈ q : si ∈ ST, si ?S−−→ s′i ∈ Ti, S σ T , (_,
〈
σ ′, _
〉
) ∈ S,T (〈σ, _〉) do {Apply every possible queued action}
21: ST ′ = (ST − {si}) ∪ {s′i}
22: q′ = dequeue(i :?T , q)
23: a′ = 〈σ ′, v, q′, ST ′〉
24: Oa = Oa ∪ {a′}
25: Ta = Ta ∪ (a i:!T−−→ a′)
26: end for
27: if v ∈ Fvlts and ∀si ∈ ST, si ∈ Fi and is_empty(q) then {Mark global final states}
28: Fa = Fa ∪ {a}
29: end if
30: return adapt = 〈a,Oa, Ia, Fa, Ta〉
It is worth observing that, in gen_all_possible_synchronisations, when the security vectors have two contract terms (lines
1–7), the algorithm needs to queue the output actions from the adaptor (line 3) which can be executed in any moment
afterwards (lines 20–26). This allows several security vectors to be executed in parallel if required.
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